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Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(3)(j) (2009), reserving the prerogative to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals.
This Court also has jurisdiction under the Constitution of the State of Utah. Utah Const.
Art.VIII, § 3.
Issues Presented for Review
I.

Did the State of Utah adequately plead its causes of action under the Utah
False Claims Act and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?

Standard of Review:

"The dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted presents a question of law, which we review for correctness.
Also, we review the interpretation and application of a statute for correctness, giving no
deference to the district court's legal conclusions." Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, \ 9,
223 P.3d 1128, 1131.
Issue Preserved:
a. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 662-690; Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, 10-14,
22-23).
b. Transcript of hearing on Motion to Dismiss dated 12/19/08 at 30-36.
c. Transcript of hearing on Motion to Dismiss dated 12/11/09 at 29, 32-35, 39-43.
d. Memorandum Decision. (R. at 1061-1073; Mem. Decision at 2-7).
e. Petition for Permission to Appeal (Utah R. App. P. 5) (03/10/09). (R. at 10801089; Pet. for Permission to Appeal, 4-5).

f. State's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint. (R. at 1493-1624; State's Resp. in Opp., 14-22).
g. Memorandum Decision. (R. at 2055-2070; Mem. Decision, 2-12).
II.

Is the State's claim under the False Claims Act barred under the applicable
statute of limitations?

Standard of Review:

"The district court's application of a statute of limitations is a

question of law which we review for correctness." Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT
59,T]95193P.3d86.
Issue Preserved:
a. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 662-690; Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, 3-4, 79, 22).
b. Plaintiffs Supplemental Submission of Authority in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.

(R. at 1004-1029; PL's Supplemental Submission of

Authority, 2-4).
c. Transcript of hearing on Motion to Dismiss dated December 19, 2008 at 36-37.
d. Memorandum Decision. (R. at 1061-1073; Mem. Decision, 8-9).
e. Petition for Permission to Appeal (Utah R. App. P. 5) (02/20/09). (R. at 10801089; Pet. for Permission to Appeal, 2-4).
f. State's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint. (R. at 1493-1624; State's Resp. in Opp., 18).
g. Memorandum Decision. (R. at 2055-2070; Mem. Decision, 3, 10).

Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
The following constitutional provision applies: Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3.
The following statutes apply: Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-1 (Supp. 2009) (effective
Apr. 30, 2007) (amending § 26-20-1 (2004)); Utah Code Ann. 78A-3-102 (3)0) (2009);
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-101 et seg.; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302(2) (2010); Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-2-307 (3) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309 (2008).
The following rules apply: Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a), 9(b), & 12(b)(6).
Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
This case will determine the State's ability to bring attorney general actions to
enforce the Utah False Claims Act ("Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-1 et seq. (2004)
(Addendum A), and protect the fiscal integrity of Utah's Medicaid program.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On May 8, 2008, the State of Utah filed a civil action against Apotex Corporation,
et al (hereinafter "Defendants"), in the Third District Court for violations of the Utah
False Claims Act (Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-1 (2004)) and fraudulent misrepresentation
against the State's Medicaid program. According to the complaint, Defendants are
pharmaceutical companies that manufacture and provide medical drugs to Medicaid

3

recipients.1 See Addendum B, Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at ^ 10 (R. at 041).
The drugs are paid for by state Medicaid funding.
The State's first complaint alleged that Defendants' conduct violated the Utah
False Claims Act, which prohibits the making of Medicaid claims based on false or
misleading information. PL's First Am. Compl.fflf57-60 (R. at 054-055). The complaint
also alleged that Defendants were guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. atfflf61-67
(R. at 055-056). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to properly plead
a violation of the False Claims Act, failure to properly state a claim of fraud uwith
particularity" under Rule 9(b) (Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) attached hereto as Addendum C), and
for seeking retroactive application of the False Claim's Act's 2007 legislative
amendments. See Addendum D, Memorandum Decision, Feb. 13, 2009 (R. at 10611073). The trial court granted Defendants' motion as to the complaint's specificity under
Rule 9(b) and its interpretation of the False Claims Act, and agreed that only limited
portions of the 2007 amendments should be applied retroactively. Id. The trial court,
however, gave the State the opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint, which the
State did. Id.; see also PL's Second Am. Compl. (R. at 1117-1185). Defendants filed
renewed 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the new complaint with mostly the same arguments
as the first. See Addendum E, Memorandum Decision, Feb. 26, 2010 (R. at 2055-2070).

Often confused with Medicare, Medicaid is a needs-based program that provides
medical care to the indigent and disabled. While Medicaid is created under a federal
enabling statute and does receive federal funding, it is administered and run by the states.
Thus, Utah has its own Medicaid program for which it is responsible.

This time, the trial court granted Defendants' motion and dismissed the case with
prejudice. Id.
This appeal by the State follows. On appeal, the State challenges the trial court's
ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and its application of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Utah False Claims Act, and the statute of limitations.
Statement of Facts
Medicaid Drug Reimbursement Program
Utah Medicaid pays for the full range of medical care needed by roughly 300,000
recipients, including prescription drugs. PL's Second Am. Compl. ^f 105 (R. at 1135).
Prescription drug benefits represent a significant portion of the State's annual Medicaid
budget, amounting to $207.6 million in 2005 alone - making Medicaid the largest buyer
of pharmaceuticals in the state. Id.
Rather than purchase the drugs directly from the manufacturers, Medicaid pays for
drug benefits in much the same way a health insurer does through provider
reimbursement. Id. at ^f 106.

For example, when a Medicaid recipient goes to a

pharmacy to fill a prescription, she gives the pharmacy her Medicaid number. The
pharmacy fills the prescription, bills Medicaid for payment, and then Medicaid
reimburses the pharmacy at a set rate. That rate is set by administrative guidelines that
are intended to give Medicaid the most competitive price and stretch taxpayer dollars
further. Id. at f 107. In essence, the guidelines require the accurate wholesale price that
manufacturers charge non-Medicaid buyers, and then use that price to calculate

Medicaid's price. Id. As such, the guidelines depend upon accurate wholesale pricing
information.
Medicaid has no way of collecting the wholesale pricing information on its own;
therefore, drug makers agree to provide the information to industry reporting service
companies such as First DataBank ("Blue Book"), Medical Economics, Inc. ("Red
Book"), and Medispan. Id. at \ 118 (R. at 1139). These companies then aggregate the
prices they receive from the drug makers and convert them into price indexes that reflect
the drugs' average prices. Id. Drug manufacturers are aware of this and agree to
participate through the Medicaid Provider Agreement.2 See Addendum F, Utah State
Medicaid Plan, attachment 4.19-B, section S: Prescribed Drugs, 19—19b; see also id, at f
107 (R. at 1135).
The most common and widely-used indexes are: (1) the "Average Wholesale
Price" or "AWP" (commonly understood as the average price charged by wholesalers to
retailers for a drug); (2) "Wholesale Acquisition Cost" or "WAC" (commonly understood
as the average price paid by wholesalers to the drug manufacturers themselves); and (3)
"Direct Price" (commonly understood as the price charged by the drug makers to nonwholesale customers). PL's Second Am. Compl. at f 107 (R. at 1135). These indexes are
used by Medicaid agencies nationwide, including Utah's, to determine their prices as
mandated by law. Id, atffif116, 118, and 119 (R. at 1138 and 1139). When a pharmacy
bills Medicaid for a prescription, Medicaid determines its payment and pays the

2

Medical providers that participate in the Medicaid program sign the Medicaid Provider
Agreement, which sets forth guidelines for the provider's involvement in the program.

pharmacy based on the appropriate index.

All of this depends upon the drug

manufacturers' honest reporting of their prices.
Defendants5 Fraudulent Actions
The formula used to determine Medicaid's payment for these drugs is set by
federal and state regulation and relies heavily upon Defendants' honest and accurate
reporting of the prices they charge other wholesale buyers. Addendum G, Plaintiffs
Second Amended Complaint atfflf107 and 116 (R. at 1135 and 1138). However, when
dealing with Medicaid, Defendants did not report real wholesale prices, but instead gave
inflated prices that were higher than what they charged others. Id. atfflf118-121 (R. at
1139-1140). This was allegedly done to increase the drugs' profit margins and thereby
increase market share, as described more fully below. PL's First Am. Compl. atfflj49-56
(R. at 051-054). As a result, Medicaid paid inflated prices for Defendants' drugs. PL's
Second Am. Compl. \ 1 (R. at 1118). This occurred with hundreds of different drugs
over many thousands of individual transactions, causing tens of millions of dollars in
overpayment. Id.\ see also PL's Second Am. Compl., Exhibit A (R. at 1147-1185); see
also PL's First Am. Compl.ffll44 and 52 (R. at 049 and 052).
Instead of reporting accurate pricing information, Defendants reported false and
inflated pricing to the reporting companies like First DataBank. Defendants reported
prices that bore no relation to any real price charged to non-Medicaid buyers; rather, the
reported prices were arbitrarily set by Defendants at rates that were significantly higher
than true wholesale price. Id. at If 118 (R. at 1139). As a result, the price indexes
calculated from the reporting companies' reports were also inflated, causing Medicaid to
7

pay significantly higher prices than other wholesale buyers for the same drugs. Id. at If
119.
Each Defendant used the above manipulation to increase their profits indirectly.
As noted above, Defendants sold their drugs to pharmacies and other medical providers,
rather than directly to Medicaid. Because of the inflated indexes caused by Defendants'
false reports, their drugs carried a higher profit margin for those providers when they, in
turn, sold them to Medicaid. Id. at Tf 116 (R. at 1138). Defendants exploited this market
advantage to sell more of their drugs to those providers, thereby increasing their profits
and market share at the State's expense. Id.
Nationwide Litigation
Because of Defendants' scheme, Medicaid agencies nationwide overpaid for drug
benefits by hundreds of millions of dollars. As a result, multiple Medicaid agencies have
filed suit against Defendants in an attempt to recover these funds. PL's Resp. in Opp. to
Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl. 5-6 (R. at 1497-1498). The evidence collected
through discovery in these cases shows that Defendants engaged in the described
behavior over extended periods of time, all at the expense of the various Medicaid
programs.
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
In response, Defendants filed and/or joined a motion to dismiss under Rules 9(b)
and 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Addendum D, Memorandum
Decision, Feb. 13, 2009 (R. at 1061-1073). Defendants argued that the State's claims did
not meet the pleading requirements of Utah law. Defendants cited Rule 9(b)'s

requirement that allegations of fraud be pled "with particularity" and argued that this
standard applies to the False Claims Act as well. Two subgroups of defendants brought
their own additional motions to dismiss. Defendant Boehringer Ingelheim Corp. ("BIC")
argued that some of its drugs were produced by corporate subsidiaries and that the State
failed to identify only those drugs for which BIC alone was legally responsible. Id. at 7
(R. at 1067). A group of generic drug manufacturers collectively known as the "Generic
Defendants" also filed a motion stating that their drug prices relied upon different
standards than AWP. The Generic Defendants argued that the State's complaint failed to
identify how inflated price reports affected the generic drug payment standards.
Finally, Defendants noted that the Legislature had amended the False Claims act
on April 30, 2007. The significant changes in the amendment included:
(1)

lowering the mens rea required for a violation of the Act from "willfully"
to "knowingly." Compare Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-2 (2004) with Utah
Code Ann. § 26-20-9.5 (2007);

(2)

increasing the civil penalty from the range of $l,000-$2,000 to $5,000$10,000 and making it mandatory, instead of discretionary. Id; and

(3)

adding of an Act-specific statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 2620-15 (Supp. 2009).

Defendants argued that the State was inappropriately attempting to retroactively
apply these changes for claims occurring before the amendment was enacted. Id. at 8 (R.
at 1068).
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The State opposed Defendants' motions, arguing that a complaint under the False
Claims Act is not subject to Rule 9(b) and that such a complaint need only plead the
elements found within the Act. See PL's Memo, in Opp. to Defs. Motion to Dismiss (R.
at 662-690). Moreover, the State argued, regardless of Rule 9(b)'s application to both
causes of action, the State's complaint was pled with enough particularity to give
Defendants adequate notice of their alleged conduct - especially in light of the many
other lawsuits filed against Defendants with the exact same allegations. Id. As to the
2007 amendment to the False Claims Act, the State argued that the amendment's plain
language made it retroactively applicable to Defendants' actions. Id.
Judge Medley agreed with Defendants' arguments concerning the specificity of
the State's claims, but granted the State the opportunity to file a Second Amended
Complaint. See Addendum D, Memorandum Decision, Feb. 13, 2009 (R. at 1061-1073).
Judge Medley instructed the State that, in order to properly plead its claim of fraud under
Rule 9(b), it must identify:
(1)

each specific drug;

(2)

each manufacturer, seller, and price reporter of each drug;

(3)

each specific false pricing report, including when and to whom it was
made; and

(4)

whether the State relied upon each specific false pricing report.

Id. at 6 (R. at 1066).
Moreover, Judge Medley held that such Rule 9(b) specifics also applied to the
False Claims Act, and therefore the State must identify each claim submitted to Medicaid
10

as a result of Defendants' conduct and the benefit Defendants derived from the same.3
Id. at 7 (R. at 1067). The judge also instructed the State to provide the detail demanded
by BIC and the Generic Defendants in their motions. Id. With respect to retroactivity of
the 2007 amendment to the False Claims Act, Judge Medley ruled that the statute of
limitations may be retroactively applied, but neither the lowered mens rea nor the
increased civil penalties could be retroactively applied. Id. at 8-9 (R. at 1068-1069).
The State's Amended Complaint and Dismissal
On March 31, 2009, the State filed its Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter
"the Second Amended Complaint" attached hereto as Addendum G). In it, the State more
fully identified each defendant, included a list of the drugs for which each defendant
provided false pricing information, and sought to meet the trial court's other instructions.
Defendants filed renewed motions to dismiss with prejudice on the same grounds
as their original motions with the added argument that the State's claims under the False
Claims Act are limitations-barred. See Addendum E, Memorandum Decision, Feb. 26,
2010 (R. at 2055-2070).The State again opposed these motions, arguing that it had
provided as much specificity as was reasonable in a concise and comprehensible
complaint and that the statute had not run. Id.
Judge Medley again agreed with Defendants. Id. He ruled that the requirements
of Rule 9(b) applied with equal force to common law fraud and the False Claims Act, and
that the State had again failed to meet that standard against all defendants. He also ruled

o

Despite the fact that actual receipt of a benefit is not an element of a cause of action
under the Act.
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that, according to the reasoning of his previous ruling, the applicable statute of limitations
had expired on any alleged violations that occurred more than one year prior to the
amending of the False Claims Act. Judge Medley therefore dismissed the State's claims
with prejudice. This appeal now seeks to overturn that ruling.
Summary of the Argument
The State properly pled its Second Amended Complaint under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Utah requires only a notice pleading, which is a liberal pleading
standard. A complaint must give only sufficient notice of the issues and an opportunity to
meet them; it need not provide every detail of its case. The State's complaint pled the
elements of the False Claims Act and common law fraudulent misrepresentation and
alleged the surrounding facts with sufficient particularity. Notably, Defendants' conduct
has sparked similar litigation throughout the nation. Consequently, the State's complaint
and nationwide litigation provided Defendants with fair notice of the claims.
Moreover, the trial court incorrectly ruled that the statute of limitations has run on
many of the State's claims. The court ruled that a one-year statute of limitations applies
to the State's claims. This is incorrect for three reasons. First, the amended Utah False
Claims Act provides for at least a three-year limitations period; this is a procedural
amendment and should be applied retroactively. Second, the pre-amendment limitations
period was at least four years, not one year. Finally, Defendants violated the Act each
time an overpriced bill was submitted to Medicaid, not when pricing was reported. Thus,
every new claim for payment based on an inflated price causes the limitations period to
begin anew against the respective Defendants. As such, the State respectfully requests

that this Court overturn the trial court's ruling and remand this case for further
proceedings. Defendants' comprehensive response to the State's claims evidences their
sufficient understanding of the issues involved.
Argument
I.

The State's Second Amended Complaint Properly Pled the State's Causes of
Action Under Utah Law.
The Second Amended Complaint was proper under Utah law. The State is not

required to plead every detail of its case in the complaint; it must only give Defendants
adequate notice of the claims against them so that they may prepare a defense. The
State's Second Amended Complaint accomplished this and required no more particularity
or detail under the law. The State pled that each Defendant has violated the False Claims
Act and committed fraudulent misrepresentation against Medicaid, including alleged
facts sufficient to fulfill the elements of both claims. The State's complaint is therefore
proper, and the case should be allowed to proceed.
A. The second amended complaint properly pled the State's claim of fraudulent
misrepresentation.
In Utah, a plaintiff need only give a defendant "fair notice of the nature and basis
or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved."
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). The State's Second
Amended Complaint contains two separate and independent causes of action that meet
this standard and provide such notice to Defendants. The complaint was therefore
adequate.
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i.

Utah's pleading rule for fraud under Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Utah's liberal pleading standard, found in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, requires only that a complaint give a "short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,1' with averments that "shall be simple,
concise, and direct. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) and (e)(1). In addition, Rule 9, which governs
the pleading of special matters, requires that complaints alleging fraud must state "the
circumstances constituting fraud . . . with particularity." Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). These two
rules are read and interpreted in harmony with one another. See Williams, 656 P.2d 971.
Thus, the State's complaint should be "short and plain," and its allegations of fraud need
only be stated with enough "particularity" to give Defendants notice of the claims against
them.
In its 1982 decision in Williams, this Court specifically examined the interaction
between Rules 8 and 9.

Quoting earlier decisions, the Court reiterated that Utah's

pleading rules "restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving" and that a
complaint is "required only to . . . give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and
basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved."
Williams, 656 P.2d at 970 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947) and
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1955)). The Court went on, '"What
[defendants] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them.
When this is accomplished, that is all that is required'"
381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963) (emphasis in original)).
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Id. (quoting Cheney v. Rucker,

Turning to specific pleadings of fraud, the Court again referred to established
reasoning: "It is to be noted that the terms 'fraud,' 'conspiracy' and 'negligence,' are but
general accusations in the nature of conclusions of the pleader . . . The basic facts must
be set forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute such
charges." Id. (quoting Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1962) (emphasis in
original)). The Court then explained the interplay between the two rules:
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" are terms of uncertain meaning. They are
conclusions that must be fleshed out by elaboration and by consideration of
the context in which they are used. This is why Rule 9(b) requires that the
circumstances constituting fraud "shall be stated with particularity" a
requirement we have construed to require allegation of the substanceof the
acts constituting the alleged wrong.
Id. at 972 (emphasis added).
The Court's statement makes it clear that Rule 9(b) does not impose a higher
standard of notice upon pleadings of fraud; rather, the Rule's purpose is to ensure that
such pleadings, with their naturally "uncertain meaning," provide nothing more than the
same level of "notice of the issues raised" to the defendant.
To accomplish this, a claim of fraud must plead the substance of the acts
constituting the alleged wrong by pleading the relevant facts surrounding the fraudulent
conduct. In its 2001 decision of Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, H 14, 28 P.3d 1271 (Utah
2001), this Court built upon the Williams decision and reiterated this interpretation:
While we have stressed . . . that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading,
unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to
preclude . . . summary judgment, a sufficiently clear and specific
description of the facts underlying the plaintiffs claim of fraudulent
concealment will satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). Our liberalized
pleading rules are designed "to afford parties the privilege of presenting

whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute,
subject only to the requirement that their adversary have fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the
type of litigation involved"
Hill, 2001 UT 16 at Tj 14 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
The Court's explanation makes it clear that Rule 9(b) is not an exacting standard.
It does not require every detail of every instance of fraud but only a "sufficiently clear
and specific description of the facts" to give a defendant "fair notice of the nature and
basis or grounds of the claim and the type of litigation involved." To this day, Utah
courts consistently apply this standard to afford plaintiffs the greatest opportunity to
sustain claims founded injustice. See Casaday v. Allstate, 2010 UT App 82, ]f 16, 232
P.3d 1075 ("Even if a complaint is 'vague,' 'inartfully drafted,' a 'bare-bones outline,' or
'not a model of specificity,' the complaint may still be adequate so long as it can
reasonably be read as supporting a claim for relief, giving the defendant notice of that
claim.") (Internal citations omitted.) {citing Canfield v. Lay ton City, 2005 UT 60, ]f 14,
122 P.3d 622 (holding that orders for dismissal or even to amend "are not generally
favored, and should only be granted when the complaint is so indefinite, ambiguous, or
vague in either its factual allegations or its legal theory that the moving party cannot
reasonably be required to frame his responsive pleading." (Internal quotations omitted.))).
ii.

The State's Second Amended Complaint set forth the relevant
surrounding facts of Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentation and
met the requirements of Rule 9(b).

The Second Amended Complaint satisfied the requirements of Rule 9(b) by setting
forth the relevant surrounding facts of Defendants' conduct and providing them notice of
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the State's claims. It identified each Defendant and each Defendant's participation in the
State's Medicaid prescription drug program, including the specific drugs each Defendant
provided to that program. It described the scheme that Defendants used to manipulate
Medicaid's payment for those drugs, the motive for doing so, the State's reliance upon
Defendants' misrepresentations, and the end result of Medicaid's overpayment. The
Second Amended Complaint plainly and concisely stated the relevant facts surrounding
Defendants' misconduct.
The law does not require more to file a proper complaint. Judge Medley's ruling
that the State must identify every instance of misrepresented pricing in order to satisfy
Rule 9(b) is not supported by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or their interpreting
cases. Defendants' conduct was ongoing for at least fifteen years, with false pricing
reports being regularly provided to the reporting companies. Defendants likely made
thousands of individual price reports, though the numbers and detail of every
misrepresentation is unknown to the State at this time. However, even if all details were
known, their inclusion in the complaint would surely violate the requirement that the
pleading be "short and plain" with "simple, concise, and direct" averments, and such
details are not necessary to satisfy Utah's "liberalized pleading rules."
Moreover, with multiple lawsuits across the country arising from Defendants'
conduct, they know precisely what the State's allegations entail and have ample notice of
the claims against them. By their very nature, Utah's liberal notice pleading rules charge
defendants with their own knowledge of the alleged acts and consider that knowledge in
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judging the adequacy of a pleading. Were this not the case, a mere "notice pleading"
could never be sufficient.
In a 1996 case involving a lease dispute, the Utah Court of Appeals used this
reasoning to reject the defendant corporation's argument that the plaintiff had not
adequately pled claims against a sister corporation, and that the complaint thus failed to
provide adequate notice:
[Defendant] had notice of the claims at issue as well as the grounds upon
which they were based. The principals in [the defendant and the sister
corporation] were the same, and [an official of both] negotiated the
assignment of the lease and was heavily involved in the project from the
beginning. In addition, it is apparent from the defenses raised by [the
defendant] that it understood precisely what claims were being made and to
which agreement they pertained. Under these circumstances, there can be
no doubt that [the defendant] had notice of [the plaintiffs] claim.
Consol Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1996);
see also Burr v. Childs, 265 P.2d 383, 387 (Utah 1953) (indicating "The deficiencies
suggested by defendant impliedly acknowledge a full understanding of the nature of
plaintiffs1 claim."); see generally Casady, 2010 UT App 82 (holding that the defendant's
independent knowledge of the nature of the claims barred it from arguing that the
plaintiffs complaint provided insufficient notice).
The Defendants' responsive pleadings show that they had full understanding of the
State's claims. See Memo, in Support of D.'s Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Jul. 31, 2008
(R. at 274-391). For example, in its Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the

Amended

Complaint,

Defendant

Pfizer

explained

the

Medicaid

reimbursement process in some detail, including an understanding of the various pricing
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indexes and express disagreements with the State's interpretation of the same. Id. at 3-7
(R. at 282-286). In its memorandum, Defendant Pfizer argues it had insufficient notice
and understanding of the State's claims. Within the same memorandum, however,
Pfizer's arguments demonstrate a deep understanding of highly complex regulations,
pricing schemes, and the State's claims arising out of them. It is therefore clear that
Defendants know and understand the State's claims.
Some of the earliest cases documenting Defendants' actions commenced nearly
ten years ago. Defendants' various memoranda make it clear how familiar they are with
the nature of the State's claim. Defendants' attempt to now "play dumb" regarding the
State's claims insults the intelligence of anyone familiar with this case and seeks only to
exploit a legal technicality.

Despite Defendants' feigned ignorance, the Second

Amended Complaint provides sufficient notice of the claims against them and satisfies
the appropriate pleading standard. To find that Rule 9(b) has not been satisfied is to find
that Defendants do not have enough notice of their alleged conduct and will not have fair
opportunity to mount a defense.

This is clearly not the case. As such, the State's

pleadings are sufficient under Utah law.
iii.

The State's Second Amended Complaint properly pled the elements of
fraudulent misrepresentation.

The proper pleading of a cause of action for fraud requires nine elements: (1) that
a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which was
false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation
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(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, and (6) that the other party,
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was
thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage. See Gold Standard, Inc. v.
Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996).
The State's Second Amended Complaint fulfills the nine elements by adequately
pleading the following facts:
• (1), (2), and (3): Defendants made false representations about the pricing of their
drugs to the reporting companies. Second Amended Complaint, ^f 134 (R. at
1143) (see also the allegations in each named Defendant's individual section of
the Second Amended Complaint);
• (4): Defendants knew of the falsity of their reports, making their conduct
"knowing and intentional." Id. atffij134, 139 (R. at 1143-1144);
• (5): Defendants knew the State would act on the false information in setting their
drug reimbursement rates and acted with the purpose of inducing it to do so. Id.
atffl[134,135;
• (6)(a): The State acted reasonably upon Defendants' pricing reports. Id. at ^ 115,
116(R. 1138-1139);
• (6)(b): The State was unaware of the true pricing of Defendants' drugs because
Defendants actively concealed those prices; therefore, the State was unaware of
their falsity. Id. at f|f 13, 20, 28, 33, 40, 45, 50, 55, 61, 69, 74, 81, 86, 91, 96,
103, &122(R. at 1121-1140);
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• (7): The State did rely upon Defendants' representations to the reporting
companies. Id. at^f 136 (R. at 1143);
• (8): The State was induced to act by Defendants' reports. Id.; and
• (9): The State was damaged by overpaying for Defendants' drugs as a direct result
of Defendants' false reports. Id. at If 137 (R. at 1144).
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, Utah law requires no more specificity than
what is found in the Second Amended Complaint. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e). As such, the
complaint properly pled the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation. Moreover, the
relevant surrounding facts of Defendants' actions were clearly stated with sufficient
particularity to provide them with adequate "notice of the issues raised and the
opportunity to meet them." Williams, 656 P.2d at 970. "This is all that is required"
under Utah law.

Id.

The State's claim for fraudulent misrepresentation against

Defendants is therefore proper, and the State respectfully requests that the trial court's
ruling be overturned and the case be allowed to proceed.
B. The second amended complaint properly pled Defendants' violations of the
False Claims Act.
The State's other claim against Defendants is for violations of the Utah False
Claims Act. The Second Amended Complaint properly stated the facts and elements of
that claim under Utah law.
i.

The Utah False Claims Act is not governed by Rule 9(b).

As the basis for part of its reasoning in finding the State's claims insufficient, the
trial court held that allegations under the False Claims Act are governed by the pleading
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rules for fraud under Rule 9(b).

This is incorrect and is unsupported by any Utah

authority. Fraud or fraudulent intent is not an element of a civil claim under the False
Claims Act. The State does not need to allege fraud to bring a claim under the Act, and
Rule 9(b) is therefore inapplicable. The State must only plead its claim with a "short and
plain" statement of the case.
Moreover, in enforcing a remedial statute, a state need not plead with specificity.
In State ex rel Brady v. Publishing Clearing House, 787 A.2d 111 (Del. Ch. 2001), the
Delaware Attomey General brought a claim against publishers alleging a violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act and the Delaware Uniform Deceptive Practices Act. The publishers
moved to dismiss the Delaware Attorney General's complaint under Delaware Rule 9(b),
which is identical to the Utah Civil Rule 9(b). Those defendants claimed that the
Attorney General did not plead with particularity. The court rejected the defendants'
argument, holding:
[T]he remedial goals of these two acts are inconsistent with the application
of the particularized pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) to enforcement
actions brought by the Attorney General to protect the consuming public.
On the contrary, a requirement that the State plead with particularity the
"who, what, where and when" of each and every one of 750,000 violations
alleged would only serve to defeat the legislative mandate of the Attorney
General in bringing actions such as these on behalf of the citizens of the
State.
Id at 117.
Given these considerations, it is clear that Rule 9(b) does not apply to the False
Claims Act, and the State's claims do not need to conform to its requirements of
"particularity."

*)7

ii.

Even if Rule 9(b) applies, the State's pleadings under the False Claims
Act satisfies the rule.

Even if the standards of Rule 9(b) applied to the State's claims under the False
Claims Act - which they do not - the State's pleadings satisfied that rule. As noted
above, Rule 9(b)'s purpose is to give claims of fraud "sufficient particularity to show
what facts are claimed" and thereby provide "notice of the issues raised and an
opportunity to meet them." Williams, 656 P.2d at 970. The State's Second Amended
Complaint accomplishes this with respect to violations of the False Claims Act.
The Second Amended Complaint clearly explained that Defendants provided false
and inflated pricing information to First DataBank, et al.9 over the statutory time covered
by the State's claim. The complaint stated that Medicaid used Defendants' information
to set its payment rates for their drugs and that Defendants thereby caused both the
submission of prescription drug claims based upon false information and Medicaid's
overpayment for those prescription drug benefits. The complaint then alleged that such
conduct violated the False Claims Act. These allegations provide Defendants with
sufficient notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them, and therefore
satisfy Rule 9(b).
The trial court ruled that Defendants do not have enough notice of their alleged
conduct and will not have fair opportunity to mount a defense. This is clearly not the
case. Defendants are aware of the nature of the claims against them and have sufficient
information to defend themselves from the State's claims. Indeed, Defendants are
already engaged in such defense with the myriad of other litigation involving the same

claims by other states. 'This is all that is required" under Utah law, and Rule 9(b) has
been met by the State's pleadings under the False Claims Act.
iii.

The second amended complaint properly pled the elements of the False
Claims Act.

The State's claims under the False Claims Act are based on Utah Code Ann. §§
26-20-3, 26-20-4, and 26-20-7 (2004), as set forth by the Second Amended Complaint.
Second Amended Complaint, *J| 125. While Defendants violated many provisions within
these statutes, the subsections that are most relevant to the State's claims are:
§ 26-20-3. False statement or representation relating to medical benefits
(1) A person shall not make or cause to be made a false statement or false
representation of a material fact in an application for medical benefits.
(2) A person shall not make or cause to be made a false statement or false
representation of a material fact for use in determining rights to a medical
benefit.
§ 26-20-4. Kickbacks or bribes prohibited
A person may not solicit, offer, pay, or receive a kickback or bribe [defined
as rebates, compensation, or any other form or remuneration] in connection
with the furnishing of goods or services for which payment is or may be
made in whole or in part pursuant to a medical benefit program, or pay or
receive a rebate of a fee or charge for referring an individual to another
person for the furnishing of goods or services.
§ 26-20-7. False claims for medical benefits prohibited
(1) No person may make or present or cause to be made or presented to an
employee or officer of the state a claim for a medical benefit, knowing the
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent;
(2) In addition, no person shall knowingly:
(c) file a claim for a medical benefit representing charges at a higher
rate than those charged by the provider to the general public.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-20-3,4, 7 (2004).
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The trigger for civil

liability is only the making or causation of a false claim. Therefore, the law does not
support the trial court's ruling that the State must specify the benefits that Defendants
collected.
The State pled all necessary elements of its case under the False Claims Act. The
Second Amended Complaint's pleadings under the False Claims Act gave Defendants
adequate and fair notice of the State's claims and satisfied Utah's notice pleading
standards. Hence, the State's claims under the False Claims Act were proper and should
not have been dismissed. The State respectfully asks the Court to overturn the dismissal.
II.

The Applicable Statute of Limitations for the Utah False Claims Act Did Not
Expire Prior to the State's Complaint.
The trial court ruled that a one-year statute of limitations applied to the State's

claims under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302(3). Because of this, the trial court ruled that,
in addition to its other reasons for dismissal, the statute of limitations had expired on all
of the State's claims that predated the complaint by more than one year. See Mem.
Decision, Feb. 26, 2010 at 10 (R. at 2064).
The trial court's ruling was incorrect for three reasons. First, a 2007 legislative
amendment to the False Claims Act created a new statutory period of at least three years
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event more than 10 \ea;s aftc t'^- date on which the v;o!ati.">n • committed.
.a

'::r , ;»..ie \m: § 26-20-15 v i, ( V J I ^ 2009).
Prior to wis amendment, the Ac! did ^o* u nve a specific statute r-i nutations.
W ith the amencii *•;•:. n^ ... r „;s.^.:, . .\}»IL-SM^ ;>.;. . •;
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aeti'Mi hiviii.'ht uii'lri Ihh ehaplrr may be brought for acts occurring prior to the effective
date of this section if the limitations period set forth in Subsection (1) has not lapsed." Id.

at §26-20-15(2).

The State filed its complaint after the amendment to the statute of limitations
period; therefore, the new limitations period applies to its complaint. See State v. Lusk,
2001 UT 102, t 26, 37 P.3d 1103 (Utah 2001) ("We hold that a statutory amendment
enlarging a statute of limitations will extend the limitations period applicable to a crime
already committed only if the amendment becomes effective before the previously
applicable statute of limitations has run . . . ."). A change in the statute of limitations is
procedural, and the change may be applied retroactively. See Harvey v. Cedar Hills City,
2010 UT 12,1f 14, 227 P.3d 256 ("[a] statute may be given retroactive effect if it changed
prior law in ways that are merely procedural."); see also Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575
(Utah 1993) ("Statutes of limitations are essentially procedural in nature . . . and do not
abolish a substantive right."); State Dept. of Human Services v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52,
If 12, 975 P.2d 939 (Utah App. 1999).
B. Prior to the amendment, the applicable statute of limitations for violations of
the Act was at least four years under Title 78B, Chapter 2 Of The Utah Code,
The 2007 amendment does not unfairly reopen limitations periods that had expired
prior to its adoption. Because the Act did not contain a specific statute of limitations
prior to the amendment, the general statutes of limitation found in Utah Code Ann. §
78B-2 would have applied. This means that a statutory period of at least four years under
the general "catch-all" statute, and perhaps even six years for actions based upon a
writing, applied to the Act. Any potential claims still open under these statutory periods
remained open under the amended Act.

1 s

cu that the one-year statute of limitations found in

^ ~8B-2-302(3), \wiivL go^cri:> certain types of penalties, applies to all of the State's
claims under the Act. However, this ruling ignores the various types i
•

•

: '-:-.

.<• - •

f : ~XB-2-302(3).

I lit false Liainii Act provides for three different types of ci- >; remedies: full
restitutio!! of the State's d a m ^ e * paxment r f all the Stated costs of entorcement of the
A f

r

r

o^ a given vjoii/.io;. .

(2004 " A',)!, ivspirt lo the claims for restitution and costs of enforcement, the default
statute of limitations of four years would generally apph
307(3); see also generally Quick /•*/•<

//.M ...•,

,

5V e Utah Code Ann § 78B-2. , /, ,
"'Ydir-ud ;Hio program, mw

pharmaceutical companies also signed a "rebate" agreement to winch the SI^IL \*„- *
party, That agreement required the pharmaceutical companies to obey state law and

Imu In i\ on ill I unyoke a statute ol limitations of six years. Utah Code , \ i m . § 78B-2-309(2)
(2008), As such, the limitations period foi those claims did m.-- :».i / r o r to either the
2007 amendment or the State's complaint.

' u V ; pro\ idea the same remedies prior to the 200/ umciuju.uu as wen. txcepi.ng
that the civil penali\ of up to ^2,000 at the time was disc-*4. '"•::" ^ ! 1ii>k r—h* *••• §
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C. Regardless of the applicable limitations period, it begins to run a new every
time a false claim is submitted based on Defendants9 inflated pricing.
This Court has consistently held that a cause of action does not accrue, and a
corresponding limitations period does not begin to run, until all necessary elements of the
action are present.

See generally Johnson v. State, 945 P.2d 673 (Utah 1997).

Accordingly, the statute of limitations cannot begin to run on false claims cases until the
false claim for benefits is actually made, regardless of the timing of the false information
or report that caused the claim. Thus, the State's cause of action accrues and the statute
begins to run when a pharmacy bills Medicaid for payment based on a rate that was
calculated using Defendants' false pricing information; it did not begin to run when that
information was first provided because the cause of action had not accrued. In other
words, Medicaid's latest receipt of an inflated bill for a given drug creates a cause of
action against the drug's manufacturer, regardless of when the defendant gave the
inflated pricing report. As a result, Defendants' liability for all of the False Claims Act's
remedies and penalties is subject to a renewed statutory period with every false claim
made.
Given these considerations, the trial court relied on the wrong statute of limitations
period. The trial court ignored the express language of the Act's legislative amendment
and the applicability of the general statutes of limitation found in Title 78B, Chapter 2 of
the Utah Code. It also misinterpreted the time when a cause of action accrues under the
False Claims Act.

The State therefore asks the Court to overturn the trial court's

decision.
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Conclusion
This case will determine the State's ability to protect the integrity of its Medicaid
program..

If Judge Medley's decision stands., the State will be denied the abi.li.ty to

n t l o i a ilte I als't1 ( L i n u s

\ u a«j"aiiiM ,i hnsi ml fiiliarmatvufical companies ihni 11 • i • t

manipulated and exploited Medicaid for their o w n financial gain.

Abuse of &uch

programs must stop, or the State v il* \u* ims^er be able \o afford the legitimate aid needed
by so many.

I he State has justifiably ICJJCG ^\, . -cienjar.ts' false representations ......

The State seeks nothing more than to compensate tax payers for these o\ eipaid funds and
lo communicate to providers that they must follow the law.
•v. .:
•VJIK-:*

. . - I tin-

i I ill! Liv I.HI\ t liiiiiiiJ llinii tin. Miilr res!"",<'t'

s

rw ( ouii nold that the; <J; State's Second Amended Complaint was propc;i\

pled under both the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the False Claims Act, and satisfied
all applicable requirements cr IDOSL juniorities sunJv;cnt to p^.\ ;^ Dciei aa-i; . •;.
adequate 110ti.ee of the State's claims

• " -egislati\ e A mendments to the I 'alse

Claims Act are to be applied retroactix el> in their entirety, in accordance with, the
Legislature's express language in Utah Code Ann § 26-20-15(2); and (3) applko-Me
slalud" nl limitations has nul run and di >,-«i m I ku lilt Stair's i. Linns.
In accordance with this request, the State asks the Court to reverse the district

court and remand this action to the trial court for further proceedings.
DATED this ffi^day of August, 2010.
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